Lessons from the Titanic Disaster

The "Titanic" as She Left Southampton, Starting on Her First and Last Voyage. This Reproduction and That of the "Carpathia," Below, Are Made to Scale, Showing the Comparative Sizes of the Ships. © American Press Association. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 803-a. GGA Image ID # 1081375cf4

Introduction

The sinking of the RMS Titanic in April 1912, during its maiden voyage, was a maritime tragedy that shocked the world and exposed significant flaws in ship design, safety practices, and emergency preparedness. In the article "Lessons from the Titanic Disaster", D.W. Taylor, a respected naval constructor in the U.S. Navy, examines the critical takeaways from this catastrophic event. While the Titanic was touted as an "unsinkable" ship, its collision with an iceberg revealed vulnerabilities that called for urgent reforms in maritime engineering and safety protocols. Taylor's analysis provides a technical assessment of what went wrong and outlines a comprehensive set of recommendations to enhance the safety of future passenger vessels. This article is a crucial reflection on how the Titanic disaster could have been mitigated and what must be done to ensure that such a disaster never happens again.

The "Carpathia," the Rescue Ship That Picked up 705 Survivors. © Underwood & Underwood. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 803-b. GGA Image ID # 10819126d6

The "Titanic" catastrophe teaches no new lesson regarding man's fallibility. It simply furnished another example of the well-established principle that if in the conduct of any enterprise, an error of human judgment or faulty working of the human senses involves disaster, sooner or later, the tragedy comes.

Reviewing the past, it is easy to see that the long-established passage lanes of the Atlantic involved a danger of just such an accident. From the point of view of safety, it was an error of judgment to give them such a northerly location.

Looking backward, it seems an error of judgment of the captain of the "Titanic" to risk passage near the ice. It seems practically inevitable that he did not for one moment think he was running any material risk of accident to his vessel, much less risk of destruction. That gallant officer and gentleman went down with his ship to honorable death, and one can never tell his story.

The fact that he was not on the bridge at the time of the collision is powerful evidence that he thought his course would have cleared the bergs whose position had been reported to him. Picked captains of Atlantic liners cling to the bridge to exhaustion whenever they consider the circumstances to involve the slightest danger to the ship.

If Captain Smith erred, it was the error of a captain whose record and the experience were of the best. We need not expect to secure greater safety by better captains, and without speculating on matters involving personnel and discipline, let us now consider issues of the material. The most salient fact is that if the "Titanic" had carried more boats or several life rafts in addition to her lifeboats, many more lives would have been saved.

Boat-Deck Plan of the "Titanic," Showing How Lifeboats Were Located, 60 Feet above the Water. There Were 16 Large Boats, to Be 8wung out by the Davits before Lowering, and Two Sea Boats, Already Swung out and Ready for Instant Use in Case of Man Overboard or Other Emergency. There Was Room for More Boats on This and Other Decks of the Liner. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 806-a & 807-a. GGA Image ID # 1082947e52

It also appears that two more boats were carried over the officers' quarters, on at least one that was not lowered but floated away when the "Titanic" sank.

There was room for many more boats. The deck plan above shows space between the two groups of lifeboats where ten more could have been carried.

Moreover, we learn from the description of the ship published in various technical papers nearly a year ago that the designers fitted each pair of the davits installed to handle two boats.

So that as regards space, there was room to install some 52, instead of 16, large lifeboats, making in all 56 instead of 20, and there is no difficulty from top-heaviness in the way of carrying the more significant number.

The boat equipment on board appears to have complied with the minimum requirements of the English Board of Trade, the responsible governmental authority in this connection. It seems practically inevitable that governments will promptly change regulations all over the world, and the lifeboat equipment of these large vessels should undoubtedly be increased to provide boat accommodations for every soul allowed on board.

Snapshot Taken by a Passenger on Board the RMS Carpathia Showing the Ice Field into Which the RMS Titanic Ran Causing the Greatest Marine Tragedy in History. © 1912 Underwood & Underwood. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 797. GGA Image ID # 1080141eff

The RMS Titanic, When It Sank, Was in 41° 46 Min. N. Lat., 50° 14 Min. W. Long., Approximately the Same Latitude as New York and Madrid. The Distances of Other Vessels in the Vicinity from the Ill-Fated Ship at the Time She First Flashed Distress Signals Were: SS California, about 10 Miles; SS Mt. Temple, 20 Miles; SS Frankfort, 40 Miles; SS Carpathia, 58 Miles: SS Niagara, 75 Miles: SS Virginian, 120 Miles; SS Baltic, 100 Miles; And SS Olympic, about 250 Miles. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 799. GGA Image ID # 1080c2bc2d

There is a great opportunity here for international, and it is very desirable that not only requirements for the safety of passengers, but tonnage rules, berthing requirements of steerage passengers, etc., should be internationally standardized.

The fact that under the circumstances, more boats would have saved many more lives from the "Titanic" and that she could have carried about three times as many lifeboats as she had should not blind our eyes to the fact that lifeboats are, after all, a very inefficient device for saving life from a sinking vessel.

If the "Titanic" had carried 56 lifeboats, it is not likely that the crew would have launched nearly all of them. One of the 20 she did carry was not launched at all, being inconveniently stowed.

The crew was new to the ship and had been inadequately trained with boat drills. Still, on the other hand, the conditions were exceptionally favorable, there being an unusually smooth sea and a little list of the vessel at any time.

Had there been any seaworthy of the name, the role of survivors would have been short indeed. The difficulty of launching lifeboats is increased enormously by a very moderate sea, and the chance of living in them after launching is very much reduced.

Properly built boats with air tanks would not sink, but if overloaded and inadequately staffed, most passengers would succumb very soon. A lifeboat that would carry 50 or 60 persons in smooth water could not take nearly so many in rough water.

The area in plan of the large lifeboats of the "Titanic" was near 200 sq. ft. Imagine some (60 persons crowded upon a rectangular platform of this area, say 12 by 18 ft., and one can form some idea of the conditions existing in a "Titanic" lifeboat loaded to capacity.

Twenty years ago, a lifesaving appliance needed not only to keep afloat but be able to make progress to port. No matter how much improved, lifeboats will probably always be inefficient as lifesaving appliances for the mammoth steamers of today. Something different is needed.

It was not sufficient to rely upon the chance of being picked up. Even if a sizeable Atlantic steamer were sunk without reporting her distress by wireless, the survivors could depend upon a quick search for them. Thanks to the wireless that is all changed now.

After the loss of the "Bourgoyne" from a collision in 1898, a prize was offered by the heirs of one of those lost for the best device for lifesaving, resulting in many suggestions. However, nothing appealed to steamship owners as commercially practicable.

The Ocean Passengers by John T. McCutcheon in the Chicago Tribune. The Men Who Used to Be First to Rush down to Have the Purser Assign Good Seats at the Tables Will Hereafter First Rush up and Have the Boat Steward Assign Their Seats in the Lifeboats. © 1912 by John T. McCutcheon. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 807-a. GGA Image ID # 108385a363

There will be a flood of suggestions due to the "Titanic" disaster. A favorite idea is a refuge deck or similar device that all hands repair when the ship begins to sink and floats cheerfully away as the boat takes its last plunge.

The idea is not so easy to carry out as to conceive, but there seem no insuperable mechanical difficulties. The bug-a-boo that there is an irresistible suction when a ship goes down has been pretty well disposed of for the present by the stories of the "Titanic" survivors.

Steamship companies would be reluctant to go to any great expense in this connection not forced upon them. Not that the companies are inhuman—far from it. But they are engaged in a business where competition is keen. When the human managers have satisfied the requirements of the governmental authorities and the insurance companies, they feel they have done all that can be expected.

The governmental authorities are supposed to look out for the lives of passengers, and the insurance companies, who stand to lose if a ship is lost, are believed to insist upon requirements that will reduce the chance of such loss to a minimum.

As illustrating the conservatism of managers of Atlantic lines, one may recall that vessels carrying cattle from America to England were fitted with bilge keels to reduce rolling long before the practice became common upon passenger vessels.

One of the Electrically Operated, Double-Cylinder, Watertight Doors in the Forward Bulkheads of the "Titanic," Which Were Closed from the Bridge. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 798. GGA Image ID # 1080a486c9

Money is lost when cattle are damaged by heavy rolling, but when passengers lose their appetites from the exact cause, the expense of the line is lessened.

When the rumors of the "Titanic's" sinking were yet unconfirmed, the company officials came out boldly with the statement that she was unsinkable.

Since then, there have been claims substantially to the effect that no pains or expenses were spared to make her safe, that the naval architect can produce no safer vessel, and that the only safety lies in avoiding the possibility of collision with- icebergs.

It is perfectly accurate that steamer lanes from the United States should avoid the vicinity of icebergs, but there are essential ports that ships cannot reach without some risk of encountering bergs.

Moreover, derelicts, though not nearly as numerous as formerly, are not unknown, and a collision with a derelict may be as dangerous as one with an iceberg.

Finally, collision with another vessel is dangerous, especially in a fog. So it seems worthwhile to consider whether the naval architect's resources regarding safety in connection with the collision were exhausted on the "Titanic."

The broadside elevation of the vessel indicating positions of decks and watertight bulkheads, shows that she had an enormous reserve buoyancy or volume above the water line.

Incidentally, one will notice that the "upper deck" is not the highest deck, and the fourth smokestack is not a smokestack at all but a ventilator from the engine rooms.

The watertight bulkheads are all transverse and all join the outer skin. It is an elementary principle of safety with such an arrangement that bulkheads must be so close together that two adjacent compartments may be flooded simultaneously without danger to the vessel.

This is a minimum requirement, and a colliding vessel may strike just at a bulkhead and throw open two compartments at once to the sea.

Midship Section of the "Titanic," Showing Single Skin above Double Bottom, and Absence of Longitudinal Bulkheads. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 804-a. GGA Image ID # 10819412ed

The "Titanic" had only a single skin on her sides above the double bottom. Experience with large steel vessels colliding with the bottom has demonstrated the tremendous protective value of the double bottom fitted on such ships.

If the ship's designers had carried up the inner bottom skin on the sides of the "Titanic," it would have much improved the protection against a collision with icebergs.

One would have probably obtained the best possible protection along this line by carrying the coal in fore and aft bunkers against the side of the ship, with watertight longitudinal wing bulkheads separating the bunkers from the boiler rooms.

Longitudinal bulkheads have been adopted on the fastest vessels crossing the Atlantic today. The additional protection afforded against collisions penetrating the outer skin is evident. The same idea is readily applied forward of the boiler space where protection is most needed.

Longitudinal wing bulkheads have some objections as ships having them will list when damaged, but with vessels having significant freeboard, the list need not be dangerous. A bulkhead does not confine the water after a collision because it is marked "W. T." (watertight) on the plans.

Section of Large Liner with Longitudinal Bulkheads. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 804-b. GGA Image ID # 1081fb580b

To fulfill the ship's purpose, it must be built so that it holds up against the pressure of the water without severe leakage and has no holes in it. If it has doors, they must be closed.

At the bottom of the "Titanic," there were doors in practically every bulkhead. They were ordinarily worked by hand, but in an emergency, a magnet energized by pressing a button on the bridge released a friction clutch and allowed the door to drop, thus closing by its weight.

The dropping or "guillotine" type of door is favored today by very few naval architects as against those operated positively by hydraulic or electric power.

A serious objection to doors that close suddenly upon remote operation appears to be based upon ineradicable characteristics of human nature.

The people who use the doors object to being cut in two, and dropping doors are very apt to be wedged or propped open so they cannot be closed suddenly and unexpectedly.

While exact information about the damage done is not available, we may speculate without much danger of exaggerating it.

A ship's officer saw water very soon after the collision in the compartment next forward of the forward boiler compartment, and firemen were driven from their quarters— two compartments forward of this— by encroaching water. This water may have found its way from the vicinity of the boiler-room bulkhead through the firemen's tunnel.

Broadside Elevation of the Vessel, Indicating Positions of Decks and Water Tight Bulkheads, Illustrating the Necessity of Carrying Bulkheads to Upper Decks, and Showing How Flooding of Compartments Forward of Boiler Rooms Would Bring the Head down so That Water Would Flow over Bulkheads into Other Compartments, Sinking Being Inevitable. The Titanic Was 882 Feet 6 Inches Long: 92 Feet 6 Inches Beam; 46,328 Tons Register and Had Accommodations for 3,500 People as Passengers and Crew. She Was the Largest and Most Luxurious Ocean Steamship Ever Built, with 11 Decks and 15 Watertight Bulkheads. The Distance from the Bottom of Her Keel to the Top of the Captain's House Was 105 Feet 7 Inches. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 806-b & 807-b. GGA Image ID # 1082ea705f. Click to View a Larger Image.

Assuming that the ship was originally at the water line shown in the illustration above—34 ft. draft—and that the vessel lost all buoyancy forward of the forward boiler compartment, the new line of flotation, which the ship would assume would be approximately AB in the illustration above.

One will observe that this is above the top of the bulkhead at the forward end of the boiler room, which extends to the so-called "upper deck" only. Hence the water would find its way aft on the upper deck and flood other compartments from above, the sinking of the ship from the position AB being inevitable.

There seems little doubt from statements of the survivors that all compartments forward of the for-ward boiler-room bulkhead were pierced below water.

If we assume a loss of all buoyancy in the forward boiler-room compartment and the compartments forward, the new line would be approximately CD in the illustration above, or the water would be nearly 20 ft. over the top of the bulkhead next abaft the damaged portion.

Of course, without detailed plans of the ship, the water lines after damage, in the illustration above, have been estimated by roughly approximate methods only.

Still, after making all allowances, it is evident that the "Titanic" would have been much safer if her watertight bulkheads forward had extended to the shelter deck, or even the saloon deck, like the bulkheads aft.

In estimating water lines AB and CD in the illustration above, we assumed that the water between bulkheads found its way freely through decks. It does not appear from the description of the "Titanic" that one made a unique endeavor to secure a horizontal watertight subdivision. From statements of the survivors, it seems that water found its way up freely through the usual deck openings.

If the vessel had been completely flooded below, forward of the boiler rooms, but with a watertight deck at the water line so that no water could pass up, the new flotation line would have been approximately EF in the illustration above.

Even with the forward boiler compartment flooded, the new line with a watertight deck would have been a little below AB instead of in the position CD.

This shows how beneficial horizontal watertight division forward would have been. With a tight deck at the waterline forward and tight bulkheads of adequate strength running, some to the shelter deck and some to the saloon deck, the "Titanic" could have had every compartment below the water from the bow to and including the forward boiler room, thrown open to the sea yet would have been perfectly safe.

In war vessels horizontal, the watertight subdivision is much used. It appears strange that so little use is made of it in passenger vessels with significant freeboard, as it is particularly adapted to add to the safety of such vessels.

With a complete watertight deck at the waterline, strong enough to stand the pressure from underneath of 30 ft. of water or so, and with all openings that could not be closed watertight trunked around to a suitable height, every compartment of the "Titanic" below water could have been thrown open to the sea. The vessel would have floated, the watertight deck forming a new bottom.

While a watertight deck with the qualities indicated would present difficulties in design and construction, it is well within the naval architect's and shipbuilder's capacities. A vessel so constructed with suitable bulkheads might, with justice, be claimed to be unsinkable by any sea danger. We might borrow a name from man-of-war practice and call it a protective deck.

There is one more matter. Suppose, in the illustration above, the area of the rudder of the "Titanic" below the waterline is measured. In that case, one will find it to be about 1/75 of the area below the water line of the whole longitudinal section of the ship. If anything, this is larger than the average ratio for merchant ships, which usually runs from 1/80 to 1/100.

But experience with vessels of war has shown that rudders can be made 1/40 of the longitudinal section, this being good man-of-war practice. In other words, men-of-war use rudders twice as large as fitted on merchant vessels of the same size. The turning powers of merchant ships would be enormously increased if they carried rudders twice as large.

The "Titanic," with greater turning power, might have avoided the collision, as in her case, the distance between safety and destruction was apparently but a few feet.

Except for her unwieldiness, the big ship, properly built, is safer against every danger than a small ship, and with rudders as large as can be fitted, the 1,000-ft. a ship of the near future need be but little more unwieldy than the 500-ft., a small-ruddered ship of a few years ago. Of course, larger rudders would involve a higher first cost and a higher cost of operation.

They were constructing the Double Bottom of the "Titanic" at the Harland & Wolff Yards, Belfast, Ireland, Looking Aft. The Ice tore this Steel Bottom as Though It Had Been Paper. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 805-a. GGA Image ID # 10823fe2c5

In conclusion, it would seem that the lessons impressed upon us by the "Titanic" disaster in seeking greater safety upon larger passenger vessels are:

1. As an immediate measure, sufficient lifeboats should be carried for all souls on board, but a combination of lifeboats and large unsinkable self-launching life rafts would be better.
2. The radio-telegraphic equipment and operation should be such that vessels near each other should always be able to communicate.
3. Longitudinal watertight wing bulkheads, or the equivalent, should be fitted.
4. Transverse watertight bulkheads should extend to the highest continuous deck as regards several at each end, and several that come next should extend to the next deck below.
5. A stout and reliably watertight deck should be fitted in the vicinity of the water line or a little above it.
6. Rudders should have about double the areas now commonly fitted on merchant vessels, with adequate power and speed operating gear.

The Arrival of the "Carpathia," in New York Harbor, with Survivors of the "Titanic," Showing the Lifeboats of the Latter Slung from the Davits. This Photograph was taken from a Tug, with Hundreds of Pounds of Powder Being Used. © Underwood and Underwood. Popular Mechanics Magazine (June 1912) p. 805-b. GGA Image ID # 108292d164

About the Author

D. W. TAYLOR, Naval Constructor, U. S. Navy - Naval Constructor David Watson Taylor, U.S. N., is regarded as one of the world's foremost authorities on ship construction. He has the unusual distinction of having been graduated by two of the greatest naval schools — the U. S. Naval Academy and the Royal College at Greenwich, England — after having made the highest marks in his examinations that had ever been attained by a student in the history of either institution.

D. W. Taylor, "Lessons from 'Titanic' Disaster," in Popular Mechanics Magazine, Vol. 17, No. 6, June 1912, p. 797-808.

Key Points

1. Recognition of Human Fallibility and Judgment Errors:

   • The article emphasizes that the Titanic disaster did not reveal any new principles about human fallibility but rather reinforced the reality that human judgment errors can lead to tragedy. The established transatlantic shipping lanes were positioned too far north, posing inherent risks of encountering icebergs.
   • Captain Edward Smith, a seasoned and respected officer, made the fateful decision to navigate near known ice, underestimating the risk of collision, believing that his course was clear of icebergs. His tragic death, alongside many others, illustrates the high stakes of maritime decision-making.

2. Lack of Adequate Lifeboat Provisions:

   • A significant lesson from the Titanic disaster was the insufficient number of lifeboats for all passengers and crew. Although the Titanic met the minimum requirements set by the British Board of Trade, these regulations were outdated and inadequate for a ship of its size and capacity.
   • Taylor highlights that the Titanic had room for up to 56 lifeboats instead of the 20 it carried. He argues for the necessity of revising lifeboat regulations to ensure sufficient capacity for every soul on board, combining lifeboats with large, unsinkable self-launching life rafts.

3. Structural Weaknesses in Ship Design:

   • The Titanic's design included watertight bulkheads that did not extend high enough to prevent water from cascading over them as the ship tilted forward. Taylor argues that these bulkheads should extend to the highest continuous deck to improve the ship's safety in a collision.
   • He also discusses the absence of longitudinal watertight bulkheads and the lack of a watertight deck near the waterline, both of which could have prevented the rapid flooding of the Titanic and possibly kept the ship afloat longer.

4. The Need for Improved Rudder Design and Steering Capabilities:

   • Taylor points out that the Titanic’s rudder was too small relative to its size, limiting its maneuverability. He suggests that rudders on large ships should be twice as large as the Titanic’s to allow for quicker and more effective evasive actions in emergencies.

5. The Role of Wireless Communication and Crew Training:

   • The article stresses the importance of continuous and reliable wireless communication between vessels. The Titanic's tragedy demonstrated that wireless equipment must be maintained and manned at all times to ensure prompt responses to distress signals.
   • Proper training of the crew in boat drills and emergency protocols is also highlighted as a crucial factor. The Titanic’s crew was inadequately trained, which contributed to the chaotic and inefficient evacuation process.

6. Recommendations for Future Safety Measures:

   • Taylor outlines several recommendations, including the installation of more lifeboats, enhanced wireless communication protocols, stronger and higher watertight bulkheads, longitudinal bulkheads, and improved rudder designs. He advocates for these changes to be internationally standardized to ensure uniform safety across all passenger vessels.

Summary

The article "Lessons from the Titanic Disaster" by D.W. Taylor offers a comprehensive analysis of the Titanic's sinking and the critical lessons it imparted to the maritime world. It emphasizes that human error, outdated safety regulations, and design flaws were significant factors that contributed to the disaster. The tragedy underscored the need for more lifeboats, better ship design with extended bulkheads and watertight decks, and enhanced wireless communication for emergencies. Taylor’s article calls for a rethinking of maritime safety standards and a commitment to rigorous international regulation to prevent future maritime catastrophes. His recommendations laid the groundwork for significant changes in shipbuilding practices and safety protocols, ensuring the safety of future generations of ocean travelers.

Conclusion

The sinking of the RMS Titanic was not merely a disaster born of hubris or a single error in judgment; it was a complex failure of design, regulation, and preparedness. D.W. Taylor's article "Lessons from the Titanic Disaster" serves as both a sobering reminder of the vulnerabilities inherent in human-engineered systems and a call to action for comprehensive reforms in maritime safety. The tragedy provided an opportunity to critically assess and improve safety standards, from the design of ships to the adequacy of lifeboat provisions and the effectiveness of wireless communication. The legacy of the Titanic is one of profound lessons learned at a great cost, driving the maritime industry towards a safer, more cautious future. As Taylor articulates, only through such rigorous assessment and adaptation can we hope to avert another disaster of similar magnitude.