Scientific Aftermath of the Titanic Disaster - 1912

Introduction

The tragic sinking of the RMS Titanic in April 1912 not only shocked the world but also spurred intense discussions among the scientific and engineering communities regarding the disaster's technical and structural implications. The article "Scientific Aftermath of the Titanic Disaster - 1912" from The Literary Digest delves into these discussions, highlighting the various perspectives of experts on how to enhance ship safety in the future. Key issues addressed include the design and arrangement of bulkheads, the impact of inertia on large vessels, the importance of constant wireless communication, and the potential implementation of safety pontoons or life rafts that could automatically detach and float away if a ship sinks. This article offers a critical examination of the scientific and engineering lessons drawn from the Titanic tragedy, emphasizing the importance of rethinking shipbuilding standards, safety protocols, and communication technologies to prevent similar disasters.

Questions in applied science, especially in engineering, suggested by phases of the Titanic disaster, continue to agitate the scientific press here and abroad.

Foremost among these are questions connected with the vessel's structure and the arrangement and efficiency of the bulkheads that were supposed to render her unsinkable.

The leading article in Engineering (London) delves into the intricate engineering aspects of the disaster. One question that demands immediate discussion and resolution is the effect of center-line or longitudinal wing bulkheads.

While it has apparent advantages, it's crucial to note that it has imperfect stability under disastrous conditions. The effect of impact on the superstructure of huge ships is another critical point that Engineering insists must be considered.

There are now usually two or three decks above the molded structure in such ships. As the boats and launching gear are carried on these decks, they might be damaged under such conditions. Would inertia have effects similar to those experienced in railway collisions, in which the carriage's body is driven from the underframe?

The Engineering Record (New York, 20 April) thinks it is pretty evident that the enormous inertia of such a great vessel contributed to her destruction.

A leading article in The Engineer (London) is also devoted to the loss of the Titanic. It raises other questions, particularly regarding arrangements for securing watertight subdivisions, comprising the number and disposition of bulkheads, the height to which they extend, and the water-tightness of the deck at their upper extremity.

Henry R. Towne, President of the Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, suggests safety pontoons for ocean vessels. He wrote to the New York Times on the subject (25 April) and followed this first suggestion with an article in Engineering News (New York, 2 May).

A Life-Raft to Form Part of the Deck. This device proposed by the London Sphere would ordinarily be part of the deck, but in case of a wreck, it would float oft as a raft holding hundreds of passengers and crew. © London Sphere. The Literary Digest (25 May 1912) p. 1096. GGA Image ID # 1087a33f99

Mr. Towne's pontoons would be independent structures built on deck to float off if the vessel should sink. A single one might be large enough to hold 1,000 persons. He writes:

Experience has shown that the modern large steamship sinks slowly when fatally injured. This would afford ample time to assemble the passengers and crew in the pontoons (except possibly a portion of the crew, which might be assigned to lifeboats as scouts) and close the doors and portholes. It also implies that each pontoon, as it became immersed, would automatically release itself and float away.

In designing a new ship, the incorporation of safety pontoons would involve no difficulties and probably would entail little, if any, additional cost. This straightforward process would ensure the safety of passengers and crew. In the case of many, if not all, existing vessels, it would be possible to remodel their upper works to incorporate these pontoons if this change were deemed advisable.

The interior of each pontoon would be as available for everyday uses as the present superstructure of the ship, which it would replace. A reasonable amount of interior decoration could be adopted without impairing the efficiency of the pontoons for their ultimate purpose in case of disaster.

In a heavy sea, the hatches on the deck or roof of the pontoon would need to be closed. Still, if protected by proper combings, one could open them in a calm or smooth sea. At times, the occupants of the pontoon could safely emerge upon the upper deck, which, of course, would be surrounded by a proper railing. Including the emergency power equipment provision for moderate interior lighting would be possible.

The pontoon is an island of safety, in or on which the passengers and crew could remain during the few hours that elapse before assistance. At that point, lifeboats would transfer them to the rescue ship or ships. This secure refuge would provide a sense of safety and protection in the event of a maritime disaster.

In a later issue (9 May), the same paper calls attention to the fact that the watertight bulkheads on the Titanic were so constructed that the margin of safety was very slight, the top of the after bulkheads being only just above the waterline:

As the filling of some of the compartments would raise the waterline on the hull, it is evident that the margin of safety obtained by the bulkhead division is soon exhausted.

It is truly remarkable to note that the American Line steamer New York, a vessel built twenty-four years ago, had the foresight to have all her bulkheads carried up to a deck that is 14 to 15 feet above the vessel's waterline. This stands in stark contrast to some of the ships built in recent years, which have their bulkheads carried to a deck only 10 feet above the waterline.

The New York was designed at a time and under conditions when shipowners placed a high value on safety against collision. Each compartment of the vessel was self-contained, a feature that undoubtedly reassured both passengers and crew.

The Electrical World (New York, 27 April) devotes special attention to the electrical engineering side of the disaster. This paper notes that two deductions stand out: the importance of constant wireless watch on board large steamers and maintaining incandescent lighting on large vessels under all emergency conditions.

It goes on:

It was my great good fortune that the single operator carried on the Carpathia happened to catch the Titanic's signal of distress. Onboard small ships, the expense of wireless watch-and-watch becomes excessive, but this expense is well warranted on large boats.

Closer communication between the wireless room and the navigation room than is now ordinary would also seem warranted to avoid unnecessary time loss in carrying emergency signals to the officer in charge.

Fortunately, lighting was capable of being maintained on the ill-fated Titanic until only a few moments before her funnels were submerged and long after the water had reached the engine room on the injured side of the ship.

This is supposed to have been due to the continuation of the generating plant operation on the uninjured side. If the ship had been plunged into darkness early in the accident's history, the confusion and terror would probably have been beyond the power of the officers and men to control, so what will ever stand out in history as an international triumph might have become an international disgrace.

Therefore, it is worth considering whether a storage battery plant for keeping the principal incandescent lamps lighted for several hours in an emergency might not be necessary on all large passenger steamers.

The stimulative effect of adequate artificial lighting on intelligence and nerves in sudden night emergencies is a factor in certain classes of illuminating engineering that one cannot ignore.

In addition, the writer believes everything points to the absolute necessity of controlling power to regulate wireless telegraphy. He says:

Dreadful as was the loss of life, it is not unlikely that without wireless calls for help, which brought a quick response, there might not have been a single survivor left to tell the story of the Titanic's recklessness and tragic end.

A few hours more, and the toughening sea and increasing cold might have completed the grim list of the dead. Still, the next twenty-four hours' experience showed only too plainly that, without the most rigorous regulation, wireless telegraphy might prove powerless to bring help in time.

Map of a Shipping Route That Will Defy The Icebergs. The Proposed Hudson Bay Route to Europe. Dotted with Bergs and Shrouded in Fog. © Engineering News. The Literary Digest (25 May 1912) p. 1097. GGA Image ID # 10881b7ac3

The experience of the Carpathia and the shore stations showed constant interference from chattering plants in every direction. Had the Titanic struck a derelict or run down another steamer near enough in-shore to have fallen within the range of this interference, it is very doubtful whether one could have made out her plight and position so that help might have reached her in time to save the boats.

The main thing is to keep so close a hand on stations of every kind that, when the hour of need comes, one can stop all interference at a minute's notice. The severest penalties should be prescribed and inflicted for sending false messages.

The dreadful experience suffered by those who had friends on board the Titanic and believed them saved by a miracle until the terrible news leaked out should never be repeated. This tragedy was avoidable, and it's within our power to prevent such a disaster from happening again through better communication and stricter regulations.

Perhaps in carelessness, fear, or greed, someone sent false messages of rescue. However, the implementation of proper regulation could prevent such incidents, ensuring that those who violate it face severe consequences, such as serving a long term in Federal prison.

Mr. Hudson Maxim, who is an expert authority on the impact of a projectile on its target, gives in Hearst's Magazine (New York) the following exciting estimate of the terrific force of the blow when the ship met the berg:

Assuming that the Titanic weighed, with load, about 50,000 tons, and considering that when she struck the iceberg, she was traveling at a speed of nearly eighteen knots, she was moving forward at a velocity of, say, about thirty-two feet a second—or about the rate which a falling body acquires at the end of the first second.

The Titanic struck with force as great as though one had dropped her upon the ice from a height of sixteen feet. Consequently, she hit that iceberg with an energy of impact roughly fifteen times 50,000 tons or 750,000-foot tons. This was equal to power sufficient to lift the battleship Oregon bodily to about seventy-five feet.

The crushing shock upon her was, therefore, as great as though she were standing on end, bow upward, and the battleship Oregon dropped upon her bow from a height of seventy-five feet.

This takes into account only the vessel's momentum and nothing for the great thrust of the propellers under her enormous horsepower to follow up the initial impact.

If the Titanic was going at full speed, she rammed the iceberg with the force of 1,500,000-foot tons. This would be energy sufficient to lift the battleship Oregon bodily to a height of nearly a hundred and fifty feet, more than enough to melt ten tons of cast iron and equal a blow of thirty twelve-inch projectiles striking her how at once.

"Scientific Aftermath of the 'Titanic' Disaster," in The Literary Digest, New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, Vol. XLIV, No. 21, Whole No. 1153, 25 May 1912, p. 1096-1097.

Key Points

1. Structural and Design Concerns:

   • The structural design of the Titanic, particularly its bulkheads, was a significant point of discussion. Engineering experts noted that while the bulkheads were meant to make the ship unsinkable, their inadequate height above the waterline reduced their effectiveness when the compartments began filling with water.
   • The concept of incorporating center-line or longitudinal wing bulkheads in ship design was debated, with some suggesting they offer stability advantages, but concerns were raised about their stability under catastrophic conditions.

2. Impact of Inertia and Superstructure Stability:

   • The Engineering Record highlighted that the massive inertia of the Titanic, due to its size and speed, contributed significantly to its destruction upon impact with the iceberg.
   • The effects of impact on the superstructure were compared to the forces experienced in railway collisions, where the carriage's body can be driven off the underframe. The placement of boats and launching gear on upper decks may also pose a risk of damage in such scenarios.

3. Innovative Lifesaving Proposals:

   • Henry R. Towne proposed the idea of safety pontoons—large, independently built structures on deck that could float off if a ship were to sink. These pontoons could accommodate hundreds of passengers and provide a secure refuge until rescue arrives.
   • The concept of a life raft integrated into the deck, which could float away in the event of a wreck, was also proposed as a solution to provide more lifeboat capacity and ensure passenger safety.

4. Electrical and Communication Failures:

   • The Electrical World emphasized the importance of maintaining constant wireless communication aboard large steamers and ensuring sufficient emergency lighting under all conditions. The Titanic's ability to maintain lighting until just before sinking was crucial in preventing further panic and chaos among passengers.
   • The article called for improved regulation of wireless telegraphy to avoid the interference that hampered rescue communications during the disaster. Establishing stricter controls and penalties for sending false messages was deemed necessary to maintain effective communication in emergencies.

5. Scientific Calculations of Impact Force:

   • Hudson Maxim provided a detailed calculation of the impact force when the Titanic collided with the iceberg. He estimated that the energy involved in the collision was equivalent to dropping the battleship Oregon from a significant height, demonstrating the tremendous force exerted upon the ship's structure.

6. Critiques of Current Maritime Safety Standards:

   • The article critiqued the lack of standardized safety measures in shipbuilding and the inconsistency in watertight bulkhead designs. The American Line's older ship, New York, was cited as a better example of safety-focused design with bulkheads extending 14-15 feet above the waterline, compared to the inadequate standards of more recent ships.

Summary

The article "Scientific Aftermath of the Titanic Disaster - 1912" provides an in-depth examination of the scientific and engineering lessons learned from the sinking of the Titanic. It highlights the deficiencies in ship design, particularly in bulkhead construction, and discusses the impact of inertia on large vessels, the need for constant and reliable wireless communication, and innovative proposals such as safety pontoons and integrated life rafts. The article also critiques the inconsistencies in maritime safety standards and emphasizes the need for rigorous regulations to prevent future disasters. By drawing from various scientific and engineering publications, the article underscores the complexity of maritime safety and the ongoing quest to enhance the safety and reliability of ocean liners.

Conclusion

The sinking of the RMS Titanic remains one of the most significant maritime disasters in history, not only for its tragic loss of life but also for its profound impact on the scientific and engineering communities. The article "Scientific Aftermath of the Titanic Disaster - 1912" from The Literary Digest underscores the importance of revisiting and revising maritime safety standards to prevent such a catastrophe from happening again. The disaster has spurred a reevaluation of ship design, structural integrity, and emergency preparedness, leading to innovative proposals and a push for stricter regulations. The insights gained from the Titanic's sinking serve as a sobering reminder that technological advancements must be matched with robust safety measures and vigilant oversight. As the world reflects on this tragedy, the lessons learned continue to shape the future of maritime engineering and safety protocols, ensuring that such an event is never repeated.